where a tenant in exclusive possession is dispossessed forcibly by a person other than landlord, can landlord maintain suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 against such person for immediate possession. ? - 2015 S.C.(2010) MSKLAWREPORTS

In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, page 617 - para 1111), `physical and legal possession' is distinguished as under:
" `Possession' is a word of ambiguous meaning, and its legal senses do not coincide with the popular sense. In English law it may be treated not merely as a physical condition protected by ownership, but as a right in itself. The word "possession" may mean effective, physical or manual control, or occupation, evidenced by some outward act, sometimes called de facto possession or detention as distinct from a legal right to possession... ...
`Possession' may mean legal possession: that possession which is recognized and protected as such by law. The elements normally characteristic of legal possession are an intention of possessing together with that amount of occupation or control of the entire subject matter of which it is practically capable and which is sufficient for practical purposes to exclude strangers from interfering. Thus, legal possession is ordinarily associated with de facto possession; but legal possession may exist without de facto possession, and de facto possession is not always regarded as possession in law. A person who, although having no de facto possession, is deemed to have possession in law is sometimes said to have constructive possession."
Pollock and Wright in their classic work, `An Essay on Possession in the Common Law' (1888 Edition, page 27) explained the nature of possession, inter alia, as follows: "Right to possess or to have legal possession. This includes the right to physical possession. It can exist  apart from both physical and legal possession; it is, for example, that which remains to a rightful possessor immediately after he has been wrongfully dispossessed. It is a normal incident of ownership or property, and the name of `property' is often given to it....
Right to possess, when separated from possession, is often called `constructive possession.' The correct use of the term would seem to be coextensive with and limited to those cases where a person entitled to possess is (or was) allowed the same remedies as if he had really been in possession....".
A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is dispossession of the landlord. The word "dispossessed" in Section 6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly, the expression "any person claiming through him" would bring within its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law. What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. The view of Calcutta High Court that where the tenant was forcibly ejected from the land by the third party, it may reasonably be held that landlord has also been dispossessed is the correct view. We find ourselves in agreement with the view of Bombay, Patna, Pepsu and Rajasthan High Courts and hold, as it must be, that there is nothing in Section 6 of the Act to bar a landlord from suing a trespasser in possession even when, at the date of dispossession, the property is in actual occupation of a tenant entitled to possession. The views expressed by Madras High Court in Veeraswami Mudali1 and (Kanneganti)  Ramamanemma5 and by Nagpur Judicial Commissioner in the case of Ramchandra4 do not lay down the correct law.
Now we advert to the incidental question whether in such a suit, tenant is a necessary party. Section 6 of the Act provides that suit to recover possession under the said provision could be filed by the person who is dispossessed or any person claiming through him. The tenant having lost the possession though without his consent to a third party, may not be interested in recovery of possession. He may not be available. He may not like to involve himself in litigation. In such circumstances, if a landlord brings the suit to recover possession against trespasser under Section 6, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that tenant must necessarily be impleaded as party to such suit. The view of Bombay High Court in Ratanlal Ghelabhai7 that landlord can sue in his own name where there is an injury to the reversion exposits the correct position of law. It may be desirable that a landlord in a suit under Section 6 of the Act against a trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant, impleads the tenant, but his non-impleadment is not fatal to the maintainability of  such suit. The view of Madras High Court in (Kanneganti) Ramamanemma5 and of other High Courts following that view do not appear to us as laying down correct law.
 In the result, appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.-2015 S.C.(2010)MSKLAWREPORTS

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