Sections 12(1)(c) and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'), for annulment of the marriage - Psoriasis is not a contagious disease nor does it constitute a ground for divorce. - The word 'suppression' does not occur in Section 12 of the Act. - The Parliament has employed the words 'force' and 'fraud'. - whether the appellant was under legal obligation to reveal the same and if so, whether there was any omission on his part.- Before a party gives consent for the marriage with the other, there is bound to be exchange of information. - While a part of information may emerge voluntarily, it is not necessary that the parties must present to each other, their entire life history thus far. - If one is curious to know any particular information about the other, certainly the same can be procured directly or from the persons who act as mediators. - There are certain important informations, such as, whether the person was already married earlier, whether he or she suffers from any serious disease which, if known to the other party, would not agree for the match. - Therefore, the respondent cannot be said to have made out a case under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act.-2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

 under Sections 12(1)(c) and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'), for annulment of the marriage. She has also prayed for return of a sum of Rs.6,50,000/- said to have been given as dowry and Rs.5,00,000/- towards cost of gold, silver and other articles said to have been presented at the time of the marriage. According to the respondent, she switched on the light during night when the appellant was sleeping and she was shocked to see that his skin was peeling off and that immediately she fainted. She further stated that on being questioned, the appellant replied stating that he is suffering from psoriasis for the past two years and that he is taking treatment from Dr. D.B.N. Murthy. The respondent stated that she left the matrimonial home in December, 2005 and at a meeting of the members of their families, the appellant admitted that he is suffering from psoriasis, but the elders opined that it is not a ground for divorce at all. Ultimately, she pleaded that the marriage is liable to be dissolved, on account of the suppression of the vital information and that had she known about the same, she would not have agreed for the marriage with the appellant. The first is about the nature of ailment. The second is as to whether the appellant was under legal obligation to reveal the same and if so, whether there was any omission on his part. Psoriasis is not a contagious disease nor does it constitute a ground for divorce. The word 'suppression' does not occur in Section 12 of the Act. The Parliament has employed the words 'force' and 'fraud'. Before a party gives consent for the marriage with the other, there is bound to be exchange of information. While a part of information may emerge voluntarily, it is not necessary that the parties must present to each other, their entire life history thus far. If one is curious to know any particular information about the other, certainly the same can be procured directly or from the persons who act as mediators. There are certain important informations, such as, whether the person was already married earlier, whether he or she suffers from any serious disease which, if known to the other party, would not agree for the match. Section 12(1)(c) of the Act gets attracted only when the consent was obtained through force or by playing fraud. The content of these words can be better understood, if one takes into account, the purport of Section 12(2)(a) of the Act. In the relevant clause, the words used are "force has ceased to operate or as the case may be fraud has been discovered". This provision can not at all be operated vis--vis the suppression of information. Therefore, the respondent cannot be said to have made out a case under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act.-2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

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