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Whether realization of the duty under the Central Excise Act will have priority over the secured debts in terms of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (1951 Act) The High Court, upon consideration of a large number of decisions opined that despite the fact that the dues of the appellant were recoverable as land revenue in terms of Rule 213(2) of the Central Excise Rules read with Section 32(g) and Section 151 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, the same by itself would not mean that a first charge of the appellant- corporation would give way thereto. It was held : "Turning to provisions of Section 169 of the Code, sub-section (1) provides that the arrears of land revenue due on account of land shall be paramount charge on the land and every part thereof and shall have precedence over any other debt demand or claim whatsoever, whether in 4 respect of mortgage, judgment-decree, execution or attachment, or otherwise however, against any land or the holder thereof, sub-section (2) provides that claim of the State Government to any monies other than arrears of land, revenue but recoverable as a revenue demand under Chapter II shall have priority over all unsecured claims against any land or holder thereof. It is thus clear that the arrears of land revenue dues on account of land shall be paramount charge on the land or every part thereof. Those will have precedence over any other dues, debts, demands, or claim. But other claims of the State Government which are recoverable as arrears of land revenue get priority over all unsecured claims against any land of holder. In the case of secured loan of the Government and other creditors, priority will depend upon precedence of such loan, it is thus clear that security of the Corporation being prior in point of time, it being in the nature of mortgage of priority, the dues claimed by Corporation will have priority over the dues of Customs." Apex court held that confirm the same and dismiss the appeal Furthermore, the right of a State Financial Corporation is a statutory one. The Act contains a non- obstante clause in Section 46B of the Act which reads as under : Section 46B--Effect of Act on other laws--The provision of this Act and of any rule or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern." The non-obstante clause shall not only prevail over the contract but also other laws.-2015 S.C.(2008)msklawreports

Whether realization of the duty under the Central Excise Act will have priority over the secured debts in terms of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (1951 Act)

The High Court, upon consideration of a large number of decisions opined that despite the fact that the dues of the appellant were recoverable as land revenue in terms of Rule 213(2) of the Central Excise Rules read with Section 32(g) and Section 151 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, the same by itself would not mean that a first charge of the appellant- corporation would give way thereto. It was held : "Turning to provisions of Section 169 of the Code, sub-section (1) provides that the arrears of land revenue due on account of land shall be paramount charge on the land and every part thereof and shall have precedence over any other debt demand or claim whatsoever, whether in 4 respect of mortgage, judgment-decree, execution or attachment, or otherwise however, against any land or the holder thereof, sub-se…

whether the purchaser of a property from an entrepreneur or industry would be liable to pay the arrears of excise duty, electricity charges and the like; is no longer res integra. = a purchaser of a property of an industry in an auction, conducted for recovery of loans, cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay the arrears of excise duty - 2015 A.P.(2014)msklawreports

whether the purchaser of a property from an
entrepreneur or industry would be liable to pay the arrears of excise
duty, electricity charges and the like; is no longer res integra.  
= a purchaser of a property of an industry in an
auction, conducted for recovery of loans, cannot be mulcted with the
liability to pay the arrears of excise duty
 - 2015 A.P.(2014)msklawreports

Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Ss. 2 (2) and 60(1) (ccc). Residential house exempt from attachment and sale in execution of court decree-Collector whether competent to order attachment and sale of residential house under Land Revenue Recovery Act. Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887. Liquor vendor-Failure to pay licence fee-Recovery initiated under - Land Revenue Recovery Act-Collector if could order attachment and sale of residential house. = Section 60 of the Code has no application to attachment and sale in any proceedings other than in execution of a decree of a civil court. It applies only to execution of a decree of civil court. It declares what properties are liable to be attached and sold in execution of such a decree and the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 60 sets out the properties which are not' liable to such ' attachment or sale. The expression such attachment or sale" in the proviso refers to the attachment and sale mentioned in sub-section (I) of section 60, that is to attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a civil court. The section does not apply to an attachment and sale under any other statute unless made expressly applicable thereto. -2015 S.C.(1983) msklawreports

Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Ss. 2 (2) and 60(1) (ccc). Residential house exempt from attachment and sale in execution of court decree-Collector whether competent to order attachment and sale of residential house under Land Revenue Recovery Act. Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887. Liquor vendor-Failure to pay licence fee-Recovery initiated under - Land Revenue Recovery Act-Collector if could order attachment and sale of residential house. =Section 60 of the Code has no application to attachment and sale in any proceedings other than in execution of a decree of a civil court. It applies only to execution of a decree of civil court. It declares what properties are liable to be attached and sold in execution of such a decree and the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 60 sets out the properties which are not' liable to such ' attachment or sale. The expression such attachment or sale" in the proviso refers to the attachm…

whether after the disposal of the appeal, the Court Receiver stands discharged or whether he continues in his office till an order of discharge is passed by the Court? -when a Receiver is appointed pending suit or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep an account of rent and profits that may be realized by the Receiver and to submit it before the court till the lis is finally decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers who are appointed comes to an end with the final decision of the case. However, even after the final decision, the Court has the discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver as and when the need arises. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellants have already put the decree in execution for recovery of possession. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Executing Court while executing the decree may take assistance of the Receiver or by appointing new Receiver or Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession in accordance with law and not more than that.=2015 SC msklawreports.

the suit property was  declared  as  evacuee  property
and the same was purchased by the appellant in an auction sale as  far  back
as on 15.6.1964.  In the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit  being  Civil
Suit No. 37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court seeking  specific
performance of the sale of the property and possession  and  interim  relief
of injunction restraining the defendants therein from  carrying  on  further
construction on the suit property. The appellant further made a  prayer  for
appointment of Receiver. Trial court rejected to appoint receiver. 
But High court appointed the receiver.
The High Court while making  appointment  of
the Receiver directed to take possession  of  the  suit  property. 
 All  the
persons who were in actual possession of any part of the suit property  were
continued to remain in possession.  The Receiver  was  directed  to  collect
rent and compensation as the case may be from  all  the  persons  in  actual
possession after verifying from  the…

whether the view taken in Surya Dev Rai that a writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order, is the correct view.= assailing an interim order of civil court in a pending suit, the defendant-respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court and the High Court having vacated the said interim order granted in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, the appellant moved this Court by way of a special leave petition, inter alia, contending that the writ petition under Article 226 was not maintainable against the order of the civil court and, thus, the impugned order could not be passed by the High Court.= Apex court held that "(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled." - 2015 SC msklawreports

whether the view  taken  in  Surya
Dev Rai that a writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution  against  the
order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order,  is
the correct view.=

assailing an interim order of  civil  court  in  a  pending  suit,  the
defendant-respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad  High  Court
and the High Court having vacated the said interim order granted  in  favour
of the plaintiff-appellant, the appellant moved  this  Court  by  way  of  a
special leave petition, inter alia, contending that the writ petition  under
Article 226 was not maintainable against the order of the civil  court  and,
thus, the impugned order could not be passed by the High Court.=

Apex court held that

"(i)   Judicial  orders  of  civil  court   are   not   amenable   to   writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution;

(ii)        Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct  from    jurisdiction
from jurisdiction under Article 226.

Contrary view in…

ACT: Civil Procedure Code. 1908: Section 64 and Order 21 Rule 57Attachment order--Execution petition or suit in which attachment ordered dismissed--Restoration of such proceed- ings--Whether attachment revived--Alienation of attached property--Whether affected. -An order of restoration of a suit dismissed for default would certainly restore or revive the attachment for the period during which it was in subsistence, namely, prior to the dismissal of the suit or execution application. In the present case both transactions, sale by the judgment-debtor and subsequent sale by the purchaser to the respondents, were effected during the subsistence of the attachment and before the Title Execution Case was dismissed for default. The Division Bench of the High Court was in error in taking the view that by reason of the dismissal of the said Title Execution Case, the attachment came to an end and the order of restoration of the said case would not affect any alienations made before the restoration, although such alienations might have been made during the subsistence of the attachment. -2015 S.C.(1987) msklawreports

The appellant filed a petition for execution of the money decree obtained by her in High Court against the judgment-debtor and attachment was levied in execution on open land and a portion of the premises in question belong- ing to the judgment-debtor. Subsequently, the judgment- debtor sold a portion of the attached property. The purchas- er in turn, sold a portion thereof to the respondents. The aforesaid execution petition was dismissed for default but later on an application by the appellant, the said Execution Case was restored, and the said property was again attached, and a proclamation for sale of the said property was issued under Order 21 Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondents' petition under Order 21, Rule 58 of C.P.C. for releasing the property purchased by the respondents from attachment was dismissed. The High Court allowed the appeal. In appeal to this Court, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that in vi…

Caste Certificate - Ancestors are Hindu Pulaya Community - Grand father embraced Christianity - Appellant re embraced Hindu Pulaya Community -Akhila Bharata Ayyappa Seva Sangham granted certificate as Hindu Pulaya Community - applied to the Tahasildar - Tahasildar issued certificate - Basing on the certificate he obtained job - on enquiry order for removal from service - and order for recovery of 15 lakhs - enquiry committee held that though converted to Hinduism - but married to Christian - not professing Hinduism - Challenged - the High Court has accepted the report of the Scrutiny Committee constituted under the Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996 (for short "the Act") wherein the caste certificate granted in favour of K.P. Manu, the appellant herein, had been cancelled. - Apex court held that the judgment in S. Swvigaradoss (supra), as far as the second principle is concerned, is per incuriam.- As far as the marriage and leading of Hindu life are concerned, we are of the convinced opinion that, in the instant case, it really cannot be allowed to make any difference. The community which is a recognised organisation by the State Government, has granted the certificate in categorical terms in favour of the appellant.It is the community which has the final say as far as acceptance is concerned, for it accepts the person, on reconversion, and takes him within its fold. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that the appellant after reconversion had come within the fold of the community and thereby became a member of the scheduled caste. Had the community expelled him the matter would have been different. The acceptance is in continuum. Ergo, the reasonings ascribed by the Scrutiny Committee which have been concurred with by the High Court are wholly unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court, findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the orders passed by the State Government and the second respondent are set aside. The appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all the benefits relating to seniority and his caste, and shall also be paid backwages upto 75% within eight weeks from today. - 2015 S.C.msklawreports

Caste Certificate - Ancestors are Hindu Pulaya Community - Grand father embraced Christianity - Appellant re embraced Hindu Pulaya Community -Akhila Bharata Ayyappa Seva  Sangham granted certificate as Hindu Pulaya Community - applied to the Tahasildar - Tahasildar issued certificate - Basing on the certificate he obtained job - on enquiry order for removal from service - and order for recovery of 15 lakhs - enquiry committee held that though converted to Hinduism - but married to Christian - not professing Hinduism - Challenged - the High Court has  accepted  the report of the Scrutiny Committee constituted  under  the  Kerala  (Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of  Community  Certificates Act, 1996 (for short "the Act") wherein the  caste  certificate  granted  in favour of K.P. Manu, the appellant herein, had been cancelled. - Apex court held that the judgment in S. Swvigaradoss (supra), as  far  as  the  second  principle  is concerned, is per inc…

Allotment of plot - not constructing unit with in two years - Notice to pay fine at 3% for the delay - challenged - High court directed to execute sale deed with out fine - DB confirmed -Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Corporation and its officers are very generous in extending time in favour of the allottees for implementing the projects on the allotted plots and not invoking its right for cancellation and resuming the plot for non-compliance with the terms and conditions of allotment letter and agreement and re-allot the same in public auction in favour of eligible persons. - order for resume of the plot.=2015 SC msklawreports

Allotment of plot - not constructing unit with in two years - Notice to pay fine at 3% for the delay - challenged - High court directed to execute sale deed with out fine - DB confirmed -
 Apex court held that we are of the view  that  the  Corporation  is
not diligent  in disposing  of  the  industrial  plots  acquired  by  it  in
accordance with law  in favour of the eligible applicants  keeping  in  view
after acquiring the land of the owners for the purpose  of  the  development
of industrial estate and allot the same in favour  of  eligible  persons  to
start industries on the allotted plots to  generate  employment  to  provide
employment to the unemployed youth in  the  State.   
Having  regard  to  the
facts and circumstances of the case, the Corporation and  its  officers  are
very generous in extending time in favour of the allottees for  implementing
the  projects  on  the  allotted  plots  and  not  invoking  its  right  for
cancellation and resuming the plot for non-compliance  wit…

Order VII Rules10 & 11 read with Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 3(4) of the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 - suitfor for declaration to the effect that the Buy-back Agreement dated 16.7.1996 executed by the plaintiff at Hisar with defendant No. 1 is null and void ab initio and is liable to be set-aside and in the alternative for declaration to the effect that the recovery of defendant No. 1 on the basis of this agreement has become time barred and that the Recovery Certificate issued by the Managing Director of the defendant No. 1 on the basis of this Agreement is null and void ab initio and is liable to be set-aside with the consequential relief of permanent injunction (prohibitory) restraining the defendants from implementing the Recovery Certificate against the plaintiff in any manner including his arrest may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff(s) and against the defendant(s) with costs. - it is clear by mere reading of the plaint that firstly, the plaintiff was a "defaulter" as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act; secondly, the investment made by defendant No.1- Corporation pursuant to an agreement dated 16.07.1996 was in the nature of the "financial assistance" as defined under Section 2 (d) of the Act; thirdly, the demand raised by the respondent was in relation to the amount given by way of financial assistance under Section 3 of the Act and lastly, the subject matter of the suit viz., challenge to the legality of the agreement and the demand fell under Section 3(4)(a) and (b) of the Act. In the light of the four aforementioned facts, which are clearly discernable from the averments made in the plaint, we are of the considered opinion that the provisions of the Act get attracted to the case in hand which, in turn, attract the bar contained in sub-section (4) of Section 3 in filing the civil suit by the defaulter. The suit is, therefore, apparently barred by virtue of bar contained in Section 3(4) of the Act. It was thus rightly dismissed by the courts below by taking recourse to Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code.=2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS

"That the plaintiff is aware of the fact that  the  jurisdiction
           of the  civil  court  is  barred  under  Haryana  Public  Moneys
           (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979.  But he is also aware of  the  law
           laid down by the Hon'ble 5 Judges of the Apex  Court  of   India
           reported  in  AIR  1969  SC  78  that  in  case  the   Statutory
           Authorities  do  not  act  in  accordance  with  the   procedure
           prescribed in the Statues, then the Civil Court  alone  has  the
           jurisdiction to entertain and try every suit.  The present  suit
           is no exception to the law laid  down  by  the  Hon'ble  Supreme
           Court of India."
     On receipt of the notice of the  suit,  the  defendants
     entered appearance and filed an application under Order  VII  Rules
     10 & 11 read with Section 21 of the Code of Civil  Procedure,  1908
     (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). Defendant  No.1  contended

No Exparte interim Injunction order can be given till disposal of main O.P./SUIT with out hearing the parties - order is liable to be set aside as it is gross miscarriage of justice -2015 A.P.[2013]MSKLAWREPORTS

It cannot therefore be doubted that the Principal District Judge, Ongole, had the power to grant interim relief pending the OP. However, such interim relief could be made absolute so as to be continued till the final disposal of the OP only after hearing all the parties concerned. In the present case, though the learned Principal District Judge, Ongole, captioned the order as an ad-interim injunction, he directed that it should continue till the disposal and final result of the main SROP. The hearing date given thereafter merely indicated that the SROP was to be heard on that date. The interim relief granted was declared to be of a final and enduring nature till the conclusion of the OP. Though it is contended on behalf of the first respondent that this was merely a mistake in the order, this Court is not impressed. The words used in the order undeniably indicate its final nature though it was stated to be an ad-interim injunction. In any event, such lapses are not expected of the Pri…

the binding nature of the temporary injunction Order granted by the lower Court on the LRs. of the party, who suffered the Order as also the interpretation of Order 39 Rule 2(A) of Code of Civil Procedure.- 2015 A.P.[2003] MSKLAWREPORTS

The Appellants in A.S. No. 2301 of 1987 filed an application in C.M.P. No. 13578 of 1999 for injunction restraining Sharfuddin, Defendant No. 1 in the suit from alienating the 'B' schedule property. However, the Court granted Orders of status quo and the status quo Orders were made absolute on 15.10.1987. While so, C.C. No. 1412 of 1997 was filed by the Appellants alleging contempt of the Orders dated: 15.5.1997 on the ground that on 11.4.1997 the respondent No. 6 and on 30.5.1997, the respondent No. 7 alienated 'B' schedule property by executing registered sale deeds. It is the contention of the petitioners that they were also bound by the status quo Orders passed by the Court against their father Sharfuddin. The petition was contested by the respondents on the ground that they are the LRs. of Sharfuddin that the property in question was already gifted to them by their father in 1981 and they sold the same to third parties in 1997.  However, this Court observed that no …

Election - total 87 Councillors, the Nationalist Congress Party with 17, Muslim League with 2, R.P.I. with 1, Samajwadi Party with 1 and 2 Independents formed an aghadi (group) and elected the first respondent as their group leader (Gat Neta).- the same was approved - change of leader by one political party -maintainable ? - No- Once an aghadi (group) is formed and duly recognized by the Divisional Commissioner, it becomes a municipal party in terms of Section 2(i) of the Act. Once original political parties form a municipal party by way of an aghadi, for all purposes, the group leader is chosen by the municipal party (aghadi) only. Rules do not provide for nomination of group leader. Similarly, the group leader of the aghadi can be changed only by the group and not by one of the political parties, big or small, belonging to the aghadi-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

Election to the Amravati Municipal Corporation was held  on  16.02.2012.  Of
the total 87 Councillors, the Nationalist Congress  Party  with  17,  Muslim
League with 2, R.P.I. with 1, Samajwadi Party  with  1  and  2  Independents
formed an aghadi (group) and elected the first  respondent  as  their  group
leader (Gat Neta). On 06.03.2012, the 23  members  submitted  the  following
application to the Divisional Commissioner, Amravati  for  approval  of  the
alliance and registration of the group leader:    
The request was granted and,  by  order  dated  11.04.2012,  the  group  was
recognized and the first respondent was registered as the group leader.     
Seeking a change of the leader, the General  Secretary  of  the  Nationalist
Congress Party,  on  22.03.2014,  addressed  the  following  letter  to  the
Divisional Commissioner, relevant port of which reads as follows:
"Subject:-  Nomination of the Group Leader of the  alliance  of  Nationalist
Congress Party in Amravati Municipal Corpor…

Once an application is duly filed in terms of Section 8 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Arbitration Act') before the civil court, what should be the approach of the court? -2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

In a suit for injunction filed by the respondent, the  prayer  made  was  to
restrain the first and second defendant  institutions  and  their  men  from
illegally taking away from the possession of plaintiff or her  employee,  or
interfering with the use and enjoyment of  ambassador or causing  damage  to
the car bearing registration  number  KL-11-AA-1473  in  the  ownership  and
possession of the plaintiff by way of a decree of injunction.  The  car  was
purchased on loan granted by the appellant.

Duly complying with the procedure under Section 8 of  the  Arbitration  Act,
the appellant filed an application bringing  to  the  notice  of  the  trial
court that in view of the agreement  for  arbitration  between  the  parties
regarding resolution of the disputes, the court did  not  have  jurisdiction
to try the case and the parties were  to  be  directed  to  the  process  of
arbitration in terms of the agreement. =
 Once an application is duly filed in terms of Section 8 of  The  Arbitration
and…

Section 498A, 306, 201 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code - case of the prosecution that the husband was keen in his extra-marital affair and that had led to more marital discord and bitterness. -The in-laws, as alleged, used to take away the income earned by her. - A time came when she was compelled to stay on the terrace of the house where she committed suicide on 4th of March, 2004 - Apex court held that the accused may have been involved in an illicit relationship with the appellant no.4, but in the absence of some other acceptable evidence on record that can establish such high degree of mental cruelty, the Explanation to Section 498A which includes cruelty to drive a woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted.-the involvement of the other accused persons, that is, appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4, we find that there is no allegation of any kind of physical torture. The evidence brought on record against them with regard to cruelty is absolutely sketchy and not convincing. - It has been alleged that the mother-in-law used to rob her money which she earned as wages. The said fact has really not been established. As far as appellant no. 4, Jesuben, is concerned, there is only one singular allegation that at one public place, i.e. in a 'mela', she had threatened the deceased that she would be divorced by her husband. On the basis of the said evidence, it is difficult to sustain the conviction under Sections 306 and 498A IPC. Once we are holding that the accused-appellants are not guilty of the offence under Section 306 and 498A IPC, the conviction under Section 201 IPC is also not sustainable. -2015 SC MSKLAWREPORTS

Section 498A, 306, 201 and 114  of  the Indian Penal Code - case of the prosecution that the husband was keen in his extra-marital affair and that had led  to  more  marital
discord and bitterness. -The in-laws, as alleged, used to take away  the income earned by her. - A time came when she was compelled to stay on the terrace of the house where she committed suicide on 4th of March,  2004 - Apex court held that the accused may have been involved in  an
illicit relationship with the appellant no.4, but in the absence of some other acceptable evidence on record that can establish such high  degree of mental cruelty,  the  Explanation  to  Section  498A  which  includes cruelty to drive a woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted.-the  involvement  of  the  other  accused persons, that is, appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4, we find that  there  is  no allegation of any kind of physical torture.   The  evidence  brought  on record against them with regard to cruelty is absolutely sketchy and…

Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. - Father filed OP - prayed for custody of child be retained by him and for injunction restraining mother not take child from his custody - Trial court granted injunction pending main petition - in the mean while father shifted his abode from Margao to Bombay - She filed Criminal Writ Petition No.87 of 2013 which had been disposed of by Orders dated 26.8.2013 noticing that proceedings under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMG Act) were pending in Goa and directing that the Mother should have access to Thalbir in Mumbai at a place near the residence of the Father. Thereafter, as already mentioned above on 31.1.2014, the Order by which the arrangement was reversed in the Impugned Order, came to be passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Margao granting custody to the Mother and visitation to the Father in Goa.- Apex court held that The HMG Act postulates that the custody of an infant or a tender aged child should be given to his/her mother unless the father discloses cogent reasons that are indicative of and presage the livelihood of the welfare and interest of the child being undermined or jeopardised if the custody retained by the mother. Section 6(a) of HMG Act, therefore, preserves the right of the father to be the guardian of the property of the minor child but not the guardian of his person whilst the child is less than five years old. It carves out the exception of interim custody, in contradistinction of guardianship, and then specifies that custody should be given to the mother so long as the child is below five years in age. We must immediately clarify that this Section or for that matter any other provision including those contained in the G&W Act, does not disqualify the mother to custody of the child even after the latter's crossing the age of five years.- We also take serious note of the Father, without notifying or taking the permission of the Civil Judge, leaving its jurisdiction along with Thalbir. Prima facie this undermines the authority of the Court and it may even tantamount to contempt of court. Section 26 of the G&W Act has been violated and that too by a person who has not been appointed as the guardian. - In the course of the hearings before us temporary visitation rights were granted to the Mother under the provision of a social worker who had been appointed by the Maharashtra State Legal Service Authority.-The Reports of the Social Worker lucidly indicate that at present Thalbir is extremely comfortable and happy in the company of his Mother but becomes agitated at the sight of his Father when he has to return to him. The Social Worker has also fervently pleaded that her Reports should be kept sealed for fear of the Father. This is extremely disturbing to us just as we expect it should be to the Father also. - Here, the Father ought not to have left the jurisdiction of Court in Goa which was discharging its duties as parenspatirae. This seems to have been completely lost sight of and instead the learned Single Judge has given premium to the unauthorised relocation. We have already mentioned the Criminal Petition 87/2013 which was disposed of by permitting the Mother to meet Thalbir; but keeping in view the pendency of proceedings in Goa, the Court rightly did not interfere with or alter or modify any of the Orders passed by the Court in Goa. Forum shopping or Court shopping requires to be firmly dealt with. The second learned Single Judge ought to have kept in mind that it was the Father who has started proceedings in Goa where the Mother was then also residing having, prima facie, been constrained to give up her employment in the Calfornia, U.S to be in a position to look after her infant son Thalbir. Co-ordinate Benches must respect prior orders.- The learned Single Judge in Writ Petition 79 of 2014 has categorically ordered that whilst the custody of Thalbir shall continue with the Father, the Mother shall get "visitation rights" which he temporarily fixed at least three days in a week "at a mutual agreeable place preferably within the jurisdiction of the Court," situate in Goa; the Trial is continuing in Goa. We fail to locate or appreciate any reason or justification for the intervention of the High Court in Writ Petition 576 of 2014 which is the subject matter of Civil Appeal of 2015 arising out of SLP (C) 32581 of 2014 by a different learned Single Judge. - Here, the Father ought not to have left the jurisdiction of Court in Goa which was discharging its duties as parens patirae. This seems to have been completely lost sight of and instead the learned Single Judge has given premium to the unauthorised relocation. We have already mentioned the Criminal Petition 87/2013 which was disposed of by permitting the Mother to meet Thalbir; but keeping in view the pendency of proceedings in Goa, the Court rightly did not interfere with or alter or modify any of the Orders passed by the Court in Goa. Forum shopping or Court shopping requires to be firmly dealt with. The second learned Single Judge ought to have kept in mind that it was the Father who has started proceedings in Goa where the Mother was then also residing having, prima facie, been constrained to give up her employment in the Calfornia, U.S to be in a position to look after her infant son Thalbir. Co-ordinate Benches must respect prior orders.- We also have taken due note of the Reports filed by the Social Worker and have heard the Counsel for the parties in this regard. We record our appreciation for the diligence with which she has performed her duties. In the event that her fees/ expenses have not been defrayed by the Father, the remainder shall be paid by the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority. We transfer the temporary custody of Thalbir to the Appellant/Mother with the direction that both of them shall reside in the address given by her, viz, House No.80, Magnolia, Ground Floor, Bin Waddo, Betalbatim, Goa and will not leave that territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court without prior leave. We further direct that the Respondent/Father shall have visitation rights between 2.30 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. on every Tuesday and Thursday, and from 2.30 p.m. to 9.00 p.m. on Saturdays. These Orders are purely temporary in nature. The Civil Judge should decide the Petition/application pending before him with expedition, as directed by the High Court, without being influenced by any observations made by us hereinabove. -2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS

Section 6 of the Hindu  Minority  and  Guardianship  Act,  1956.  - Father filed OP - prayed for custody of child be retained by him and for injunction restraining mother not take child from his custody - Trial court granted injunction pending main petition - in the mean while father shifted his abode from Margao to Bombay  - She  filed Criminal Writ Petition No.87 of 2013 which had been disposed  of  by  Orders dated 26.8.2013 noticing that  proceedings  under  the  Hindu  Minority  and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMG Act) were pending in Goa and directing that  the Mother should have  access  to  Thalbir  in  Mumbai  at  a  place  near  the residence of  the  Father.    Thereafter,  as  already  mentioned  above  on 31.1.2014, the Order by which the arrangement was reversed in  the  Impugned Order, came to be passed  by  the  learned  Civil  Judge,  Senior  Division, Margao granting custody to the Mother and visitation to the Father  in  Goa.- Apex court held that The HMG Act postula…