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Whether a defendant in a suit for partition can be permitted to withdraw an admission made in the written statement after a pretty long period, is the issue arising for consideration in these cases.?- Admission can not be withdrawn but can be clarified or explained by way of amendment = We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas (supra) and as endorsed in Gautam Smiarup (supra) that a categorical admission made in the pleadings cannot be pertted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (supra), does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled. However, the admission can be clarified or explained by way of amendment and the basis of admission can be attacked in a substantive proceedings. In this context, we are also mindful of the averment in the application for amendment that: “11. …. Mahabir Prasad Kajaria died at age of 24 years on 7th May, 1949 when the defendant No. 5 was only 2 years and the defendant No. 12 was only 21 years. Till the death of Mahabir and even thereafter, the petitioners had been getting benefits from income of the joint properties. The defendant No.5 and his two sisters, namely, Kusum and Bina were brought up and were maintained from the income of the joint family properties. The petitioners after the death of Mahabir, they continued to live in the joint family as members and till now members of the joint family. In the marriage of the two sisters of the defendant no.5 Kusum and Bina (now after marriage Smt. Kusum Tulsian and Smt. Bina Tulsian) the expenses were wholly borne out from the incomes of the joint family properties. The said facts are well known to all the family members and their relations.” In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 have stated as follows: “The alleged letter of 1956 allegedly issued by the widow of Mahabir Prasad used in the arbitration proceedings where she was not a party admitting relinquishment of the share of her husband and thereafter admitting such letter in the original pleading is not what the answering respondents want to resile and/or withdraw from but by the present amendment had only ought to explain the circumstances in which such letter has been written.” In the above circumstances, we do not intend to make the suit filed in the year 2005 otherwise infructuous. The application for amendment withdrawing the admissions made in the written statement on relinquishment of the claim to the suit property by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 is rejected. However, we, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are of the view that Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 should be given an opportunity to explain/clarify the admissions made in the written statement. Accordingly, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 are permitted to file an application within one month from today limiting their prayer only to the extent of explaining/clarifying the disputed admissions in the written statement which will be considered on its merits and in the light of the observations made herein above.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

Whether a defendant in a suit for partition can be permitted to withdraw an admission made in the written statement after a pretty long period, is the issue arising for consideration in these cases.?- Admission can not be withdrawn but can be clarified or explained by way of amendment = We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas (supra) and as endorsed in Gautam Smiarup (supra) that a categorical admission made in the pleadings cannot be pertted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (supra), does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled. However, the admission can be clarified or explained by way of amendment and the basis of admission can be attacked in a substantive proceedings. In this context, we are also mindful of the averment in the application for amendment that: “11. …. Mahabir Prasad Kajaria died at age of 24 years on 7th May, 1949 whe…

The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS In reiteration of the golden principle which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases, this Court in Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam (2013)12 SCC 406 had held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of “may be” true but has to upgrade it in the domain of “must be” true in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjecture. It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. The materials on record when judged on the touch stone of the legal principles adumbrated hereinabove, leave no manner of doubt that the prosecution, in the instant case, has failed to prove unequivocally, the demand of illegal gratification and, thus, we are constrained to hold that it would be wholly un-safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant under Section 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act as well. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is hereby set-aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail bond stands discharged. Original record be sent back immediately. -2015 S,C,MSKLAWREPORTS

The proof of demand of  illegal  gratification,  thus,  is   the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and  13(1)(d)(i)&(ii)  of  the  Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail.   Mere acceptance of any amount  allegedly  by  way  of  illegal  gratification  or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not  be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove  the  demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere  recovery  of  the  amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or  13  of  the  Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS   In reiteration of the golden principle which  runs  through  the web of administration of justice in criminal  cases,  this  Court  in  Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam (2013)12 SCC 406 had held that suspicion,  however grave, cannot  take the place of…

Whether the application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in terms of clause 22.3 of the Supply Contract between the parties which was entered is maintainable without following the procedure of giving notice and without naming the arbitrator by mutual consent when the sole arbitrator recused himself ? - No , the application is a premature one.- 2015 MSKLAWREPORTS Under Section 15(2) of the Act in a situation where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute arbitrator is required to be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator who is replaced. Clause 22.3 of the Supply Contract contemplates appointment of a sole arbitrator by the parties by mutual consent. In a situation where the original arbitrator i.e. Shri Justice S.K. Dubey had recused himself the substitute or new arbitrator is required to be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the original arbitrator. This is the mandate of Section 15(2) of the Act. It was, therefore, incumbent on the petitioner to give notice and explore the possibility of naming an arbitrator by mutual consent and only on failure thereof the present application under Section 11(6) of the Act could/should have been filed. The above recourse is required to be followed by virtue of the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act and the decision of this Court in Yashwith Constructions (P) Ltd. (supra). Admittedly, the same had not been followed. In these circumstances, the Court will understand the present application/arbitration petition to be premature. It is accordingly not entertained leaving it open for the petitioner to act appropriately, if so advised, in terms of the present order and thereafter seek its remedies as provided by law. The Arbitration Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 2015 SC MSKLAWREPORTS

Whether the application under Section  11(6)  of  the  Arbitration  and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred  to  as  “the  Act”)  seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in terms of  clause  22.3  of the Supply Contract between the  parties  which  was  entered  is maintainable without following the procedure of giving notice and without naming the arbitrator by mutual consent when the sole arbitrator recused himself ? - No , the application is a premature one.- 2015 MSKLAWREPORTS

Under Section 15(2) of the Act in a situation where the  mandate
of an arbitrator terminates, a  substitute  arbitrator  is  required  to  be
appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment  of
the arbitrator who is replaced.

Clause 22.3 of the Supply Contract contemplates  appointment  of
a sole arbitrator by the parties by mutual consent.
In  a  situation  where
the original arbitrator i.e. Shri Justice S.K.  Dubey  had  recused  himself
the substitute or new arbitrator…

Section 157 - A of the U.P Zamindari And Land Reforms Act-"157-A. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Castes. - (1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in sections 153 to 157, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste shall have the right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Caste, except with the previous approval of the Collector : Provided that no such approval shall be given by the Collector in case where the land held in Uttar Pradesh by the transfer on the date of application under this section is less than 1.26 hectares or where the area of land so held in Uttar Pradesh by the transferor on the said date is after such transfer, likely to be reduced to less than 1.26 hectares. (2) The Collector shall, on an application made in that behalf in the prescribed manner, make such inquiry as may be prescribed." From a perusal thereof, it would be clear that nowhere does the Section restricts itself to agricultural land. On the contrary, the language used is that no Bhumidhar or Asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste Category shall have the right to transfer any land without the approval of the Collector. In the present case, admittedly, no previous approval for transfer has been granted by the Collector though according to petitioner the lease deed was registered without any objection. In our opinion, once an act has to be done by a specific method, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that because at the time of executing of the lease deed, the said lease deed was registered and that amounts to a transfer granting approval by the Collector under Section 157-A of the Act. We are therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Collector having not granted approval prior to the execution of the lease deed, the respondents were right in not awarding marks to the petitioner under the head of land and infrastructure. 2015 Allahabad High court[2011] MSKLAWREPORTS

Section 157 - A of the U.P Zamindari And Land Reforms Act-"157-A. Restrictions on transfer of land by members of Scheduled Castes. - (1) Without prejudice to the restrictions contained in sections 153 to 157, no bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Caste shall have the right to transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage or lease to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Caste, except with the previous approval of the Collector : 
Provided that no such approval shall be given by the Collector in case where the land held in Uttar Pradesh by the transfer on the date of application under this section is less than 1.26 hectares or where the area of land so held in Uttar Pradesh by the transferor on the said date is after such transfer, likely to be reduced to less than 1.26 hectares. 
(2) The Collector shall, on an application made in that behalf in the prescribed manner, make such inquiry as may be prescribed." 
From a perusal thereof, it would be clear that nowhere doe…
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Suit for specific performance - Sec.20 of Specific Relief Act - Sec.13 of Indian Evidence Act - whether criminal court finding is binding on civil court - Apex court held that when it is quater white paper and when the original agreement of sale mentioned in it not produced - Court has to exercise it's discretion under sec.20 of Specific Relief Act - Court can not come to a conclusion on criminal court findings as it is not final conclusion one , with out giving an independent finding. - High court committed wrong - suit is dismissed as held by trial court - 2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS

High Court partly allowed the appeal, set aside  the  judgment  of
the trial court and decreed the suit  of  the  plaintiff-respondents  herein
for specific performance as well as  for  recovery  of  possession  of  suit
items I, II and III.

 The children of late Jambusab could not agree  to  divide
the properties of late Jambusab.  They  litigated  and  ultimately  in  R.A.
133/49-50 on the file of the High Court, a final decree was passed  and  the
properties described in the Schedule to the plaint fell to the  joint  share
of the first plaintiff and his younger brother R.A. Rasheed.   The  date  of
the decree is 22.08.1950.
The first plaintiff and his younger brother  thus
became the exclusive joint owners of the suit  schedule  property  and  from
the date of the High Court decree namely 22.08.1950.

The first item of  the
suit schedule which was designed as a Cinema building was leased jointly  by
the first plaintiff and his  younger  brother  R.A.  Rasheed  to  late  N.K.
Subbaiah…