APEX COURT DIGEST - Jan.2017 [9],

Sections 406, 409 read with Section 120(B) of IPC-for quashing of FIR on the ground that it is purely civil in nature -entered  into a conspiracy, pursuant to which fabricated documents  were  created  and  in land acquisition proceedings concerning land bearing City Survey No.  20722, situated within the limits of Aurangabad Corporation,  compensation  to  the tune of Rs.23.48 lacs was received by the appellant without there being  any entitlement. - HELD THAT - We have gone through the record and considered rival submissions.  The  High Court found three infirmities namely  that  Onkargiri,  predecessor  of the plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit No.81 of 1993 did not have any title;  that no sale deed was  executed  by  the  plaintiffs  in  favour  of  said  three persons; and that the document of lease  stated  to  be  in  favour  of  the appellant  did  not  mention  any  rent  at  all.  In  the  face  of   these observations it cannot be said that the dispute in question  was  purely  of civil nature. If on the basis of false and fraudulent documents a  claim  is made which leads to award of compensation in land  acquisition  matter,  the interest of the State is certainly compromised or adversely  affected.   The matter cannot then be termed as a civil dispute simplicitor. The  crime  was therefore rightly registered. - 

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