The words in Order XII Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make such order…” show that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent’s claim. In the suit for eviction filed by the respondent-landlord, appellant-tenant has admitted the relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement; but resisted respondent-plaintiff’s claim by setting up a defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an advance of Rs.82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied by the respondent-landlord. The appellant- defendant also filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is contested by the respondent-landlord. When such issues arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS



The words in Order XII Rule 6 CPC “may” and “make such order…” show that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent’s claim. In the suit for eviction filed by the respondent-landlord, appellant-tenant has admitted the relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement; but resisted respondent-plaintiff’s claim by setting up a defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an advance of Rs.82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied by the respondent-landlord. The appellant- defendant also filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is contested by the respondent-landlord. When such issues arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

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