Posts

Showing posts from May, 2015

“Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?” (There is a variance between the view expressed by this Court on the above question in Saketh and in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore[2].) Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly.-2015 S.C.(2013) MSKLAWREPORTS

As the Limitation Act is held  to  be  not  applicable  to  N.I.  Act, drawing parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee  where the Limitation Act  was held not applicable, we are of the opinion that with the aid  of  Section  9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 it can be safely concluded  in the  present case that while calculating the period of  one  month  which  is  prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the  period  has  to  be  reckoned  by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. it is not possible to hold that  the  word  ‘of’ occurring in Section 138(c) and 142(b) of the N.I. Act is to be  interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’ occurri...
Read more

Negotiable Instrument Act Sec.118 - Material alteration - When the promissory note was tampered by adding Figure "1" before the figures 25,000/- so as to make as Rs. 1,25,000/- and when the Hand Writing Expert reported that the Figure "1" was added later so as to make as Rs.1,25,000/- and when mediators deposed that one of the promissory note not returned -Mere admission of the execution of the Promissory note by the defendant can not be considered as conclusive proof of passsing of consideration under sec.118 of N.I.Act - 2015 S.C.(2011) MSKLAWREPORTS

Negotiable Instrument Act Sec.118 - Material alteration - When the promissory note was tampered by adding Figure "1" before the figures 25,000/- so as to make as Rs. 1,25,000/- and when the  Hand Writing Expert reported that the Figure "1" was added later so as to make as Rs.1,25,000/- and when mediators deposed that  one of the promissory note not returned  -Mere admission of the execution of the Promissory note by the defendant can not be considered as conclusive proof of passsing of consideration under sec.118 of N.I.Act - 2015 S.C.(2011) MSKLAWREPORTS
Read more

Or.39, rule 1 & 2 C.P.C. - suit for set aside preliminary and final partition decrees and also for injunction - Interim Injunction - Purchased property - Claimed fully demarked and separated with the unsold share of defendant with his consent only - Partition suit by defendant with out impleading the plaintiffs in respect of suit property is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs - Trail court granted interim injunction and appeal dismissed - Revision to High court - Their lordships held that preliminary decree and final decree can not be kept aside from consideration like wise specfic demarcation and separation records of sold extent with unsold extent of defendant with the consent of defendant can not be kept aside - directed to appoint an advocate commissioner to find out whether the suit schedule property is a demarked property or covered with the unsold extent of defendant and if it is demarked the plaintiff is entitled for injunction otherwise not - Without identifying the property no interim injunction should be granted - 2015 A.P.(2005) MSKLAWREPORTS

 The petitioner filed O.S.No.77 of 2000 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Narsapur, Medak District against respondents 5 to 12 for the relief of partition and separate possession.  An ex parte preliminary decree was passed therein and subsequently, a final decree was passed on 4.12.2003 in I.A.No.426 of 2001 demarcating an extent of Ac.18.29 guntas.  Respondents 1 to 4 filed the present suit, being O.S.No.23 of 2004 for setting aside the preliminary and final decrees passed in O.S.No.77 of 2000. They pleaded that the suit was filed in collusion with the defendants therein and without impleading them, with a sole object of defeating their rights. They contended that on the strength of the preliminary and final decrees, the petitioner is encroaching into the land purchased by them and prayed for temporary injunction; by filing I.A.No.84 of 2004. The application was resisted by the petitioner herein. The trial Court granted  temporary injunction and i...
Read more

whether the industrial dispute raised by the respondent-workmen before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Anantapur is maintainable under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') (or it should have been routed through by raising regular conciliation proceedings and referred to the Labour Court as required under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act.-NO) - yes - as the respondent-workmen asserted before the Labour Court that they were directly employed and paid by the petitioner-Corporation and they had completed more than nine years of service including the service rendered with the erstwhile Kallur Gram Panchayat, which merged with the petitioner-Corporation. - 2015 A.P.(2003) MSKLAWREPORTS

 In the claim statements filed by them before the Labour Court, they stated that they were employed for more than nine years continuously in the Water Works Department of Kallur Gram Panchayat, which merged with the Municipal Corporation, Kurnool with effect from 8-2-2002. Consequent to the merger, their services along with others were taken over by the Corporation. Even after the merger, they were engaged till 28-2-2003.  With effect from 1-3-2003 their services were orally terminated, which amounts to retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act and violative of Section 25-F, G and H of the Act. There was no necessity of terminating their services, since there was heavy workload in the Corporation. It was also asserted that they worked under supervision and control of the petitioner herein and his subordinates.  They were not free or at liberty to do or to attend to the works entrusted to them at their will and convenience.  Their performance was ...
Read more

Regularization of Contract Labourers - Award by Labour Tribunal Guntur - Since the Tribunal not consider the various facts & law and has to consider the latest developments - their lordships, therefore, partly allowed the writ appeal by modifying the order of the learned Single Judge and thereby, the award of the Labour Court to the effect that, (a) the reference made at the instance of the respondent shall be treated as unworkable since there is no uniformity in the conditions of appointment or nature of grievances of the employees, represented by it; (b) as regards such of the employees whose (i) services were regularised by the management or (ii) settled by payment of lumpsum amount or compensation, the I.D shall stand rejected; and (c) in case, any individual employees have any grievance about the retrenchment or discontinuance from service, it shall be open to them to raise individual disputes under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D. - 2015 Telangana & A.P.(2014) msklawreports

 the appellants have established LPG Filling Plant at Tadepalli, Guntur District and another Plant at Kondapalli, Krishna District.  Different categories of workers are engaged to carry out the functions in the respective Plants.   The union of the workers at Tadepalli Plant approached the Government with a request to refer an Industrial Dispute to the Labour Court, Guntur in relation to the regularization of services of 52 workmen.   It was pleaded that the workmen were being engaged as Contract Labour in   contravention of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short the Act) and in that view of the matter, the appellants herein need to be treated as principal employer.    The Government referred the dispute under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the I.D. Act) to the Labour Court, Guntur.  After contest by the parties, the Labour Court passed an award d...
Read more

Regularization of labourers appointed on compassionate grounds - their lordships held that they cannot be termed as contract labourers, more particularly when they had their initial appointment under a scheme of compassionate appointment.In the result, the present writ petition is allowed with a direction to the respondent company to regularise the services of the petitioners under the category of compassionate appointment, with all attendant benefits of service by taking into account the other parameters as to their suitability. It can be seen from the record that already the petitioners are in their fifties and have not been left with much service. As such, the process of regularisation may be completed as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs - 2015 Telangana & A.P. (2014)MSK lawreports

appointed on compassionate grounds during the   year 1985-86, that since the date of their initial appointment, they have been working continuously in their respective posts discharging their duties, that their nature of work is similar to that of the regular employees, and that though they have completed more than 21 years of service as on the date of filing of the writ petition, their services have not been regularised.   they cannot be termed as contract labourers, more particularly when they had their initial appointment under a scheme of compassionate appointment.   In the result, the present writ petition is allowed with a direction to the respondent company to regularise the services of the petitioners under the category of compassionate appointment, with all attendant benefits of service by taking into account the other parameters as to their suitability. It can be seen from the record that already the petitioners are in their fifties and have n...
Read more

Whether the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the appellant aggrieved by an order of status quo till 11-6-2003 granted in I.A.No.447/2003 in O.S.No.142 of 2003 dated 30-5-2003 on the file of Vacation Civil Judge-cum-II Additional District Judge is maintainable with out following the regular procedure ? - Yes - Moving regular court too is not a bar for maintaining this appeal - 2015 A.P.(2003) MSKLAWREPORTS - http://mskpublications.blogspot.in/

Division Bench already held          "It is clear that under O.43, R.1(r), the right of appeal given to the affected party is not only against a final order of injunction passed by the lower Court after hearing both the parties under R.4 of O.39 but also against an ex parte order of injunction passed by the lower court under O.39 R.1 without hearing the affected party.     Normal judicial machinery for correction of ex parte orders is the original Court itself.  But under O.43, R.1(r) the injuncted party can go to an appellate Court against an ex parte order even without first going before the original Court.  So long as the statute has so willed the Courts should give effect to that expression of the legislative will, particularly in the case of remedy by way of an appeal". Conclusion  The order of status quo granted in the present case is an order passed by the Vacation Civil Judge in exercise of his po...
Read more

Or.39, rule 3 A C.P.C . an application filed to furnish security as by obtaining interim injunction orders , the plaintiff is enjoying his property with out paying any rents/charges to him - pending disposal of suit , this petition to furnish security for Rs.29.45 lakhs - Trial court returned the same as it holds no pecuniary jurisdiction and to present the same before proper court - Their Lordships held that no application is maintainable pending suit under Or.39, rule 3 A as under this rule court only has got power suo motu to direct the party who obtained interim injunction to furnish security - and as such their lordships further held that Therefore, the Court below is directed to determine the damages payable to the petitioner - defendant towards injury and loss sustained by the petitioner - defendant by virtue of the grant of temporary injunction and call upon the respondent - plaintiff to furnish security.Therefore, after disposal of the suit, on application made by the petitioner - defendant, compensation may be awarded, if the Court below comes to the conclusion that the petitioner - defendant has sustained injury or loss, by virtue of the above said injunction. - 2015 A.P.(2002) MSKLAWREPORTS - http://mskpublications.blogspot.in/

The respondent - plaintiff filed the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the petitioner - defendant and his agents from removing and interfering with the erection of hoardings and electrical fittings and maintenance thereof and they also filed I.A. No. 913 of 1995 for interim injunction for the same relief during pendency of the suit under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code which was accordingly ordered on 13.7.1995 by the Court below and the respondent - plaintiff is carrying on the business of displaying and advertising the products of its customers. It is alleged that under the guise of interim injunction, the respondent - plaintiff has given a go bye to its obligations under the said agreement to pay monthly charges to the petitioner and thus the respondent - plaintiff has committed breach of agreement. It is also averred that using the suit property for hoarding beyond the period of the agreement, without paying of the agreed charges, is nothing but abuse of the...
Read more

Or.39, rule 7 of C.P.C - Petition for preservation of properties belongs to the petitioner - as the Govt. is going to demolish the building in road widening scheme - Or.39, rule 1 made absolute against the petitioner infavour of the respondent - Trial court allowed the Petition wrongly - their lordships held that In a suit for injunction, though the question of possession as on the date of filing of the suit is most relevant, there may be other ancillary and incidental questions as to the conduct of the parties before the Court. The concept of possession in law should take in its spectrum all rights, liabilities, immunities and claims vis-`-vis the property which is said to be in possession. When the Court recorded a prima facie finding that Gayatri bai is in possession, she was also in law entitled to take advantage of that presumption. Unless the defendant properly pleads and proves at the earliest stage regarding any such movables or immovables attached to the immovable property, no defendant can be heard of saying that his belongings were lying in the disputed property. - 2015 A.P.(2001) MSKLAWREPORTS

<CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - - Or.39 Rr.1 and 2 - - Or.39 R.7 - - Suit for possession - - Interim injuction granted was made absolute - - Later on defendant filed a petition to remove and keep in safe custody certain movables laying in the disputed premises alleging that those belong to him and may get spoiled in case of demolition of the building for road widening - - Lower Court ordered handing over such articles after preparing necessary list to the respondent/defendant.         Scope and ambit  of Or.39 R.7 and when the power thereunder to be exercised - - Laid down. >HELD:         Order 39 Rule 7 CPC empowers the Court to make an order for detention, preservation and inspection of any property which is the subject matter of the suit or as to which any question may arise in the suit.  The submission that the power under Rule 7 can be exercised only in respect of the subject matter is therefore not well founded. The...
Read more

Contempt of Courts Act Sec.10 &12 - Non-initiation of contempt proceedings under Or.39, rule 2 A C.P.C. - Limitation for initiation of Contempt Case - starts from the date of knowledge -this court either on complaint or suo motu, can take cognizance of the contempt and punish the contemnors. - Third party, if committed contempt, can be impleaded and proceeded against. - 2015 A.P.(2000)MSKLAWREPORTS

<CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - - Ss.10 & 12 - -  Contempt of Courts Rules - -     R.24. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - - Or.39 R.2A - - Limitation for initiation of Contempt case - - "Initiation" meaning of - - Laid down.  Non-initiation of Contempt proceedings under Or.39 R.2A does not bar initiation under Ss.10 & 12 of Contempt of Courts Act. Third party, if committed contempt, can be impleaded and proceeded against. >HELD: Limitation for initiation of contempt case starts from the date of knowledge of alleged violation of the order of the competent court.  The initiation of contempt proceedings includes issuing of notice by this Court calling upon the contemnors to show cause why the contemnor shall not be punished.  From this, it has to be presumed that the court has taken cognizance of the contempt though it might not have admitted the contempt case.... In order to see that substantial justice is done and dignity of the co...
Read more

C.M.A. under Or.43, rule 1 can be filed against the interim injunction orders granted under Or.39, rule 1 &2 C.P.C - when the trial court failed to dispose the Interim injunction Application within 30 days by flouting the mandatory rule framed under Rule 3 A of Or.39 C.P.C. - 2015 S.C.(2000)MSKLAWREPORTS

"Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the Court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39, Rule 3A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. In such appeal, if preferred, the appellate Court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate Court in complying with the provisions of Rule 3A. In appropriate...
Read more

No Judicial Officer is expected to sit with mouth shut in open court - No Transfer Petition Maintainable on that ground alone - Trail Judge - opined that Or.38, rule 5 C.P.C. is a proper petition rather than Or.39, rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. - adjourned the case several times as the respondent absent despite of allegations that the respondents are going to alienate the properties - their lordships held that expressing an opinion is not an advise to the party and further held that A Judge, who is presiding the Court, cannot be expected to be a mere silent spectator. In fact, Judges have to play an active role. They should not and need not allow the parties or advocates to argue for hours together on the same points or on an issue when it is clear that in an application or a suit or a proceeding is not maintainable. There is nothing wrong if a Judge openly says that a particular petition is not maintainable. It cannot be treated as an advise to a party. Sometimes, Judges may be seeking further information, clarification or assistance from the advocates while arguing the matters. Knowing or unknowingly, sometimes, they may even go to the extent of expressing their view about the maintainability or otherwise of a petition or a suit. If the request of the petitioner is accepted, it amounts to giving a direction to all the Presiding Officers to shut their mouth while conducting the Court proceedings and this cannot be allowed - 2015 A.P. (2013) MSKLAWREPORTS

The first respondent filed a detailed counter. The remarks of the Officer were also called for.  The Presiding Officer observed as follows: "On 25.07.2012 while the petitioner was submitting reply arguments, the Court sought for clarification about the maintainability of the petition since the suit O.S.No.14/2012 is filed for recovery of money with interest and no breach of obligation by the respondents 1 to 9 existing in his favour is averred in the petition and since the same point was argued by the respondents 1 to 9 besides taking several pleas about the maintainability of the petition and in that context there is an interlocution that normally in a suit for recovery of money no injunction petition is maintainable without alleging breach of obligation existing in favour of petitioner by the other side and it is usual practice of filing petition under Order-38, Rule-5 seeking attachment of properties and even in that case also no ex parte or...
Read more

Whether principle of res-judicata is applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, is the question involved herein. - Apex court held finally that in such a situation, the previous judgment in permanent injunction suit will not be a bar for declaration of title and recovery of possession.- 2015 S.C.(2008) MSKLAWREPORTS

"As a matter of fact even such an issue was not framed.  The High Court, therefore, in our opinion posed unto itself a wrong question.  In a suit for permanent injunction, the Court had rightly proceeded on the basis that on the date of the institution of the suit, the first respondent was in possession of the disputed land or not.  It was not required to enter into any other question. It, in fact did not.  It is one thing to say that a person is in possession of the land in suit and it is another thing to say that he has a right to possess." The Supreme Court held finally that in such a situation, the previous judgment in permanent injunction suit will not be a bar for declaration of title and recovery of possession.-2015 S.C.(2008) MSKLAWREPORTS
Read more

Recall of Witnesses for Cross Examination – Old suit for Partition – Despite of giving one or two opportunities – petitioner not cooperated and conducted cross examination - Aliment of petitioner and his family members is not the sufficient cause for recalling the witnesses - as the Cross Examination can be done by his counsel by taking proper instructions from the petitioner – Trial court dismissed the same – High court confirmed the same and dismissed the revision - 2015-Telangana & A.P.-MSKLAWREPORTS

Seeking recall of PWs.1 to 3 for cross-examination on his behalf – suit for partition - PW.1 filed his affidavit in lieu of chief-examination on 06.02.2013 and thereafter, the matter was posted for cross-examination of PW.1 on 15.02.2013 and 21.02.2013 and again, it was adjourned to 01.03.2013 and 08.03.2013. -  The petitioner herein, who is the 1st defendant in the suit, has failed to cross-examine PW.1.  - In the meantime, PWs.2 and 3 have filed their chief affidavits and they were cross-examined by defendant No.4.  - Now at this stage, recall petition of PWs.1 to 3 is filed.            - Reasons furnished that the petitioner is nearly 70 year old man having certain health problems and his wife and son were challenged persons and he has to take good care of them. - All these factors cumulatively, came in the way of the petitioner herein in cross-examining PWs.1 to 3.  - This explanation has not found favour...
Read more

Eye Witnesses presence Doubtful - Suppression of Earlier Complaint which destroyed the entire story of present version - Resulted in Acquittal - Murder took Place at 7-30 p.m. - caught hold of Lingappa’s son Basavaraj-deceased while he was returning home, tied his hands behind his back splashed chilly powder on his face and assaulted him with a club of stones causing injuries on his head and other parts of body leading to his death. The incident is alleged to have been witnessed by Hanumantha (PW-1), brother of the deceased, and Mannamma (PW-4), mother of the deceased.- but the Eye Witness took no steps to rescue the deceased and to join him in the Hospital - even not untied the hands and all awaited till the arrival of police to take him to the treatment said to be dead on the way - Unnatural & Unbelievable reactions of the witnesses makes their presence on the spot doubtful - Earlier version as admitted by witnesses said that the injured was dead by the time police reached - that report not filed - This implies that the earliest version about the incident was destroyed by PW-19 and a new story stated in the fardbeyan was tailored to suit the prosecution version. This has the effect of completely demolishing the prosecution case and rendering its version wholly unacceptable. - Trail court rightly acquit the accused - High court committed an error and as such Apex court set aside the same and restored the orders of trial court - 2015 SC MSKLAWREPORTS

order of the Trial Court  acquitting  the  appellants  set  aside,  and  the appellants convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous  imprisonment  for  a period of seven years under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.  A fine of Rs.5,000/- each and a default sentence of imprisonment for a  period one year has also been awarded to the appellant.  on 19th September,  2006  at about  7.30  p.m.  the  appellants  are  alleged  to  have  caught  hold  of Lingappa’s son Basavaraj-deceased while he  was  returning  home,  tied  his hands behind his back splashed chilly powder on his face and  assaulted  him with a club of stones causing injuries on his head and other parts  of  body leading to his death. The incident is alleged  to  have  been  witnessed  by Hanumantha (P...
Read more

Accident case - Deceased Bachelor - Pundit - High court fixed his income as Rs.12,000/- per month - Personal expenses considered as 50% - future income prospects fixed at 50% - as the age of deceased 30 years ,multiplier fixed at 17 - Apex court fixed compensation at Rs.18,36,000.00 - 2015 S.C.MSKLawreports

They are the parents of late Satendra Kumar Jain, aged 30  years,  who  died in a motor accident on 12.07.2008. He was self-employed as Pandit. He was  a bachelor. Hence, the claim by the parents The appellants claimed an amount of  Rs.95,50,000.00.  The  Claims  Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.6,59,000.00 including loss of  dependency to the tune of Rs.6,24,000.00 with interest @ 7.5 per cent from the date  of institution of the petition. Dissatisfied, appellants  approached  the  High Court of Delhi in MAC APP. 687/2011 leading to the  impugned  judgment.  The High Court enhanced the compensation and fixed it  at  Rs.12,61,800.00  with interest as ordered by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court fixed the  monthly  income  to  Rs.12,000.00  and  added  30% towards future prospects relying  on  Santosh  Devi  v....
Read more

Sec.5 of Limitation Act - Or.9, rule 13 of C.P.C. - Delay of 355 days in one suit and delay of 382 days in another suit - Reason for delay only after seeing the paper publication - Trial court order to deposit decreed amount for settling aside the decree else would be dismissed automatically - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that though the court has got discretion to impose some costs or to direct to deposit part of suit claim but should not have imposed such an unreasonable and onerous condition of depositing the entire suit claim of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- respectively in the suits when the issues are yet to be decided on merits - set aside the orders of Trail court and High court - 2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

 The respondents filed the suit being O.S.No.3/2011 for recovery of  the  sum  of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- with interest.  The case was adjourned from time  to  time on various dates. On 16.06.2011, the  appellants-defendants  were  set  ex- parte in the suit.  After recording evidence  adduced  by  the  respondents- plaintiffs  on  5.07.2011,  the  said  suit  was  decreed  ex-parte  by  the Principal District Judge, Thanjavur. Respondents have also filed another suit O.S. No.6 of  2011  for recovery of a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- said to have been paid by  them  to  the appellants by way of an advance towards the purchase  of  another  property. The said suit was decreed  ex-parte  on  16.06.2011.   The appellants filed I.A.No.77 of 2012 and I.A.  No.78  of  2012 in both the s...
Read more

Sec.482 of Cr.P.C. - Sec.499, 500,501,502,503 I.P.C. - Sec.196,198,199 of Cr.P.C.- Sanction against each and every accused - Held not necessary - allegations “Police sources say Vanjara and Pandian nabbed Kousarbai in Bidar with help from S.P. Rajiv Trivedi of the Hyderabad Special Investigation Unit………Rajiv Trivedi provided cars with fake number plates in which Sohrabuddin was brought to Ahmedabad and then killed in a fake encounter.” - Quash petition was dismissed by A.P.High court - holding that the news telecast in the electronic media by CNN-IBN and other news items published in various newspapers of the appellants per se are integrally connected with the official discharge of duties of the second respondent and held that whether the same amounts to defamatory, libel or scandalous statements is a matter that has to be decided on the evidence to be adduced by the parties.- and further held that in the absence of any privilege to the broadcaster on par with Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, the appellants cannot claim to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them and there was no merit to quash the said criminal proceedings against the appellants.- Apex court confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal - 2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

A news item on various dates in the year 2007, allegedly making  false implication  against  the  second   respondent-Rajiv   Trivedi,   Additional Commissioner of Police (Crimes and SIT),  Hyderabad,  Andhra  Pradesh,  with regard to the Sohrabuddin encounter case was published by the appellants  in the respective publications and was telecast on  CNN-IBN. A  representation was given by the second-respondent to the Andhra  Pradesh  State  Government seeking previous sanction under Section 199(4)(b) of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure (in  short  ‘Cr.P.C.’)  for  prosecution  of  the  appellants  for offences punishable under the provisions  referred  to  supra. Accordingly, the previous sanction was accorded by the State  Government  vide  G.O.  Rt. Nos. 6581, 6582, 6583 and 6580 dated 27.10.2007...
Read more