Evidence Act Sec.90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old = 30 years Old presumption- Reg. Gift Deed presumption - how to recon 30 years whether from the date of filing in court or at the time of tendering in evidence - Apex court held that at the time of tendering evidence - 2015 S.C (1/2015) MSK LAW REPORTS 14
30 years Old presumption- Reg. Gift Deed presumption - how to recon 30 years whether from the date of filing in court or at the time of tendering in evidence - Apex court held that at the time of tendering evidence - 90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.-Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.-Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable." This Explanation applies also to section 81. The law surrounding the date of computation of the elapse of thirty-years stands long-settled, since the verdict of the Privy Council in Surendra Krishna Roy v. Mirza Mahammad Syed Ali Mutawali AIR 1936 PC 15, which held that the period of thirty years is to be reckoned, not from the date upon which the Deed is filed in Court but from the date on which, it having been tendered in evidence, its genuineness or otherwise becomes the province of proof. Most often where the Courts countenance document which has been in existence for thirty years or more, the likelihood of either of the attestators thereof being alive is rather remote. Once it is satisfactorily proved that the document is thirty years or more in age, Section 90 thereupon dispenses with the formalities of producing the executant and or the attestators thereto. The first and fatal stumbling block of the Appellant's case, then, is that at the time of tendering of the Gift Deed before the Trial Court, the thirty-year maturation period provided by Section 90 was not satisfied, the Gift Deed having been tendered in evidence after around 29 and one-half years, since he had alluded to it in the course of the Defendant/Appellant examining himself unlike the stage of pleadings this incontrovertibly partook the nature of tendering evidence. While clarifying law as we have striven to do above, since the Gift Deed in question was tendered in evidence five months prior to having become thirty years old, the Appeal is devoid of merits. - 2015 S.C (1/2015) MSK LAW REPORTS 14