2017 A.P. DIGEST - 8



 Order XXVI Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for sending expert opinion at fag end of the arguments- delay - dismissed = suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale - Ex.A.1, in the year 2010. - filed a written statement wherein they have denied the execution of the agreement of sale by disputing the signatures.- I.A. under Order XXVI Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to send Ex.A.1 and the written statement in original to an handwriting expert for comparison of the admitted signatures with the disputed signatures on Ex.A.1. - This application was dismissed by the lower Court on the sole ground of inordinate delay in filing the application and especially at the stage of arguments. - their lordships held that I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that cause of action for his client to file the application for sending the suit document for experts opinion arose only on closure of the defendants evidence. With the denial of execution of Ex.A.1 in the written statement, cause of action had arisen for the petitioner to come out with an application for sending the suit document for experts opinion. I cannot refrain from observing that it is the laid- back approach of the parties or their counsel in filing applications belatedly that has not only been causing prejudice to the interests of the parties, but also leading to abnormal delays in disposal of cases. Had the petitioner been diligent in filing an application immediately after filing of the written statement or at least before commencement of the trial, his interests would have been well-served. The Courts, facing severe pressure of pendency of cases for long time, cannot be expected to allow applications of this nature thwarting their efforts to dispose of cases as quickly as possible. On the one hand the litigants are critical of abnormal delays in disposal of cases and on the other hand they file applications after applications in pending suits, some of them are wholly needless, at far too belated stages stalling the suit proceedings. This attitude of the parties as well as their counsel need to be changed and sooner it happens it is better for the litigant public. I am of the opinion that the discretion exercised by the Court below in rejecting the application of the petitioner cannot be said to be either irrational or improper warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The civil revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

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