“Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?” (There is a variance between the view expressed by this Court on the above question in Saketh and in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore[2].) Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly.-2015 S.C.(2013) MSKLAWREPORTS




As the Limitation Act is held  to  be  not  applicable  to  N.I.  Act,
drawing parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee  where the Limitation Act  was
held not applicable, we are of the opinion that with the aid  of  Section  9
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 it can be safely concluded  in the  present
case that while calculating the period of  one  month  which  is  prescribed
under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the  period  has  to  be  reckoned  by
excluding the date on which the cause of action arose.
it is not possible to hold that  the  word  ‘of’
occurring in Section 138(c) and 142(b) of the N.I. Act is to be  interpreted
differently as against the word ‘from’ occurring in Section  138(a)  of  the
N.I. Act; and that for the purposes  of  Section  142(b),  which  prescribes
that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date  on  which  the
cause of action arises, the starting  day  on  which  the  cause  of  action
arises should be included for computing the period of 30 days.  As  held  in
Ex parte Fallon[27] the words ‘of’, ‘from’  and  ‘after’  may,  in  a  given
case,  mean  really  the  same  thing.   As  stated  in  Stroud’s   Judicial
Dictionary, Vol. 3 1953 Edition,  Note  (5),  the  word  ‘of’  is  sometimes
equivalent of ‘after’.
We have noted  that  in  this
case reliance is not merely placed on Section 12(1) of the  Limitation  Act.
Reliance is also placed on Section 9 of the General Clauses  Act.   However,
since, in the instant case we have reached a  conclusion  on  the  basis  of
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and on the basis of a  long  line
of English decisions that where a particular time is given, from  a  certain
date, within which an act is to be done, the  day  of  the  date  is  to  be
excluded,
we  are  of  the  opinion  that
Saketh lays down the correct proposition of  law.   We  hold  that  for  the
purpose of calculating the period of one month, which  is  prescribed  under
Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned  by  excluding
the date on which the cause of action arose.  We hold that  SIL  Import  USA
does not lay down the correct law.  Needless to say  that  any  decision  of
this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh  by  this
Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down  the  correct  law  on  the
question  involved  in  this   reference.    The   reference   is   answered
accordingly. -2015 S.C.(2013) MSKLAWREPORTS


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