Whether the sister can claim compensation under M.V.Act ? - Yes. Whether the Insurance company can be exonerated as difference in the type of licence held by the driver ? - No. - 2015 TELANGANA &A.P. MSKLAWREPORTS




In view of the above precedential jurisprudence, the Insurance
Company cannot be automatically exonerated merely because of the  
difference in the type of licence held by the driver.  the Insurance Company
shall establish that the owner has willfully committed breach of the terms of
the policy and further the defect in the driving licence is the fundamental
cause for the accident.  Inspite of establishing this fact, still the Tribunal
can 
direct the Insurance Company to pay compensation and recover from the 
owner.  In the instant case, the Insurance Company could not establish that
the owner willfully committed breach of the terms of the policy and non-
possession of transport driving licence was the fundamental cause for the
accident. It must be noted that driver was not altogether disqualified from
holding the licence. So in these circumstances, the Tribunal instead of
exempting the Insurance Company ought to have ordered pay and recover. 
Hence, such a direction is required in this appeal. This point is answered
accordingly.

 the claimant being
the sister of the deceased is not his dependant and hence does not deserve
compensation. It must be said that this argument does not hold water either
on facts or on law. On factual side, it is the case of claimant that she is the
own sister of the deceased and that the deceased had no wife and children
and he was a dumb person and similarly the claimant is also not having
husband and children and therefore, both of them were interdependent on
each other. This fact is not controverted by the respondent in the O.P. As
such, it is clear that the claimant is dependant as well as legal representative
of the deceased and hence she deserves compensation. Even the decision  
cited by the appellant in Manjuri Beras case (3 supra) reveals that the
liability under Section 140 of M.V. Act does not seize because of lack of
dependency. In that case, a claim petition was filed under Section 140 of
M.V. Act by the married daughter of the deceased. Thus it is clear that
dependency is not a sole factor for awarding compensation under M.V. Act.
In the instant case, the claimant besides being the legal representative of the
deceased, his dependant too.  - 2015 TELANGANA &A.P. MSKLAWREPORTS

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