whether the view taken in Surya Dev Rai that a writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order, is the correct view.= assailing an interim order of civil court in a pending suit, the defendant-respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court and the High Court having vacated the said interim order granted in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, the appellant moved this Court by way of a special leave petition, inter alia, contending that the writ petition under Article 226 was not maintainable against the order of the civil court and, thus, the impugned order could not be passed by the High Court.= Apex court held that "(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled." - 2015 SC msklawreports

whether the view  taken  in  Surya
Dev Rai that a writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution  against  the
order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order,  is
the correct view.=

  assailing an interim order of  civil  court  in  a  pending  suit,  the
defendant-respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad  High  Court
and the High Court having vacated the said interim order granted  in  favour
of the plaintiff-appellant, the appellant moved  this  Court  by  way  of  a
special leave petition, inter alia, contending that the writ petition  under
Article 226 was not maintainable against the order of the civil  court  and,
thus, the impugned order could not be passed by the High Court.=

Apex court held that

   "(i)   Judicial  orders  of  civil  court   are   not   amenable   to   writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution;

 (ii)        Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct  from    jurisdiction
from jurisdiction under Article 226.

 Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled." - 2015 SC msklawreports

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